

Moral Responsibility for Computing Artifacts: Four Rules

Preamble

The complexity of computer artifacts does not absolve those who design, develop, or deploy systems from responsibility for the technologies they introduce. We propose four rules as a guide to moral responsibility for computing artifacts.

A Working Definition of “Moral Responsibility”

The following is from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [1]:

When a person performs or fails to perform a morally significant action, we sometimes think that a particular kind of response is warranted. Praise and blame are perhaps the most obvious forms this reaction might take. ... To regard such agents as worthy of one of these reactions is to ascribe moral responsibility to them on the basis of what they have done or left undone. ... Thus, to be morally responsible for something, say an action, is to be worthy of a particular kind of reaction—praise, blame, or something akin to these—for having performed it.

For our limited purposes, we will not make statements about legal liability, concentrating instead on issues of ethical accountability. The particular kind of accountability we discuss here will be identified using the phrase “moral responsibility” throughout.

A Working Definition of “Computing Artifacts”

An artifact is an object made or shaped by humans [2]. We use “computing artifact” for any object that includes an executing computer program as part of the object. We intend to include software applications running on a general purpose computer, programs burned into hardware and embedded in mechanical devices, robots, webbots, programs distributed across more than one machine, and many other configurations.

The Importance of Sociotechnical Systems

We place each computing artifact into the context of “sociotechnical systems.” A sociotechnical system includes people, relationships between people, other artifacts, physical surroundings, customs, assumptions, procedures and protocols. [3]

We acknowledge the importance of sociotechnical systems to the issue of moral responsibility for computing artifacts. As a straightforward example, a GPS navigator is a computer artifact, but in isolation from the satellites it uses for ascertaining location, it cannot perform its function. People, commercial enterprises, governments and artifacts were necessary to design, develop, and deploy the satellite system and the navigator. The people who make the device encourage and discourage different uses by the navigator’s design. The people who buy the navigators choose to use it in different ways. A communications protocol for communicating with those satellites had to be negotiated between stakeholders. The methods by which people have agreed to identify places on the earth’s surface form another part of the sociotechnical system without which an automated navigator is incomprehensible.

The significance of sociotechnical systems complicates any discussion of moral responsibility for computing artifacts. On one hand, ignoring the sociotechnical systems in which a computing artifact is embedded is folly. On the other hand, including all relevant sociotechnical systems components in every discussion of moral responsibility involving a computing artifact will make it impractical to assign meaningful responsibility to the humans most directly involved with that specific artifact. In order to negotiate this tension, we first discuss moral responsibility for computing artifacts in a more focused sense (Rules 1, 2 and 3), and then place this discussion into a perspective that explicitly includes sociotechnical systems (Rule 4).

Rule 1: The people who design, develop, and deploy a computing artifact are morally responsible for that artifact, and for the foreseeable effects of that artifact. This responsibility is shared with other people who design, develop, deploy and knowingly use the artifact as part of a sociotechnical system.

Rule 2: The shared responsibility of computing artifacts is not a zero-sum game. The responsibility of an individual is not automatically reduced as more people become involved in designing, developing, deploying and using the

artifact. Instead, a person's responsibility includes his or her accountability for the behaviors of the artifact and for the artifact's effects after deployment, to the degree to which these effects were reasonably foreseeable by that person.

When humans design, develop and deploy computing artifacts, they do so consciously and intentionally. This intentionality is important when discussing moral responsibility. Rules 1 and 2 are meant to clarify the moral responsibility of the people most directly accountable for a specific computing artifact and its effects on others.

Rule 2 is meant to address the problem of many hands, in which responsibility that is broadly shared can become insignificant for any one individual. See [4] for more detail on this issue.

The words “reasonably,” “foreseeable” and “knowingly” add complexity, subtlety and ambiguity to these rules. This is unfortunate, as we'd like the rules to be as straightforward as possible. However, in order to make the rules realistic, we don't immediately see a way to make them simpler than this.

By using the word “foreseeable,” we acknowledge that the people who design, develop and deploy artifacts cannot reasonably be expected to foresee *all* the effects of the artifacts, for all time. However, implicit in our use of this word is the expectation that these people make a good faith effort to predict the uses and effects of the deployment. Willful ignorance, or cursory thought, is not sufficient to meet the ethical challenges of Rules 1 and 2.

Furthermore, if people design an artifact in such a way that it is not possible to reasonably predict its future behaviors, then those people are particularly responsible for the unpredictable, and potentially harmful, results. We insist that machines that are designed to adapt over time, “learn” without human supervision, or self-modify their own code, are machines for which the people who launch them are *more* rather than *less* responsible than people who launch more predictable machines. We assert that a machine's unpredictability increases people's responsibility for anticipating problems and safeguarding against them. People who recognize their responsibilities in this way are likely to make their machines simpler and more predictable in order to make them safer and more reliable; we would welcome this outcome.

Another caution about Rules 1 and 2 concerns a decision to *not* create or deploy an artifact. This decision also has consequences. For example, if it is reasonably foreseeable that the creation and deployment of an artifact is likely to have a *good* effect, and the decision is made to *not* create and deploy that artifact, that decision has ethical significance, and those who made the decision are responsible for the consequences.

Rule 3: People who knowingly use a particular computing artifact are morally responsible for that use.

The word “knowingly” is problematic in this rule, but we think it is, on balance, appropriate. People who “use” a particular computing artifact may or may not be aware of this use. For example, the driver of a car may not have any knowledge of a computing artifact embedded in the car, an artifact that records data for analysis in case of a crash. It seems to us counter-intuitive to assign moral responsibility to the driver for the use of that artifact. However, when someone knowingly, intentionally, uses a particular computing artifact, that person takes on moral responsibility attached to that use. A dramatic example is when someone launches a cruise missile at an enemy target; a more mundane example is when someone searches the web for information about a prospective employee. The moral responsibility of a user includes an obligation to learn enough about the computing artifact's effect to make an informed judgment about its use.

It is not our intent to absolve the users of computing artifacts from any moral responsibility if they are willfully ignorant about artifacts or their effects. Rule 3 could be misused in this way. We acknowledge this problem, but we judge that the possibility of this abuse does not negate the importance of acknowledging that there are practical and ethically significant differences in the way people interact with computer artifacts. For example, “users” of computer artifacts cannot be reasonably held accountable if the use is hidden from them. (The hidden nature of the artifact may be intentional or incidental.) However, people should not seek, or even allow themselves, to be ignorant about technology and its effects in order to avoid responsibility for their use of technology. As with Rules 1 and 2, the same considerations apply to agents who consciously decide *not* to use an artifact.

In order to place Rules 1, 2 and 3 into perspective, we assert a fourth and final rule:

Rule 4: People who design, develop, deploy, and knowingly use a computing artifact can only do so responsibly

when they make a reasonable effort to take into account the sociotechnical systems in which the artifact is embedded.

Sociotechnical systems are increasingly powerful. If people thoughtlessly produce and adopt these systems, they are, in our opinion, being morally irresponsible; ignorance is not a justification for harms associated with computing artifacts.

Rule 4 is intended to be a progressively heavy burden. It requires an honest effort to identify and understand relevant systems, commensurate with one's ability and one's depth of involvement with the artifact. Thus, the burden is heavier for those with more expertise and more influence over the artifact's effects. Those in design and development cannot shift their burden to the users (see Rule 2), and users cannot shift the burden to developers when users' local knowledge is critical to appropriate ethical action. The sociotechnical systems in which an artifact would be embedded should be considered even when the decision is to not design, develop, deploy or use an artifact.

Rule 4 expands the effect of Rules 1, 2 and 3, since people who obey Rule 4 will know more about the effects of an artifact they produce and/or use.

Computing Artifacts that are Not Exceptions to the Rules

No matter how sophisticated computing artifacts become, the rules hold. For example, if a computing artifact uses a neural net, and the designers subsequently are surprised by the artifact's effects, the rules hold. If a computing artifact is self-modifying, and eventually becomes quite different from the original artifact, the rules still hold. If a computing artifact is a distributed system or an emerging system, the rules still hold for all the humans associated with the pieces that are distributed, for the humans associated with the organization of the overall system, and for the humans responsible for the system from which the new system emerged. If a computing artifact A is launched to build another computer artifact B, and artifact B builds computing artifact C, then the rules are applied repeatedly so that the humans moral responsible for A are also responsible for B and C. (That is, if you are not willing to accept moral responsibility for A, B, and C, then you should not launch A.)

As described in the discussions of the Rules above, there are responsibilities associated with *not* launching any artifact. However, when the predictability of an artifact's future behavior is in serious doubt, we maintain that the precautionary principle [5] should be applied, which will require a particularly serious effort to weigh (uncertain) benefits against (unpredictable) costs. We recognize that this is a heavy burden on those advocating launching such artifacts, and we contend that this is appropriate.

References

[1] Andrew Eshleman. Moral Responsibility. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Latest revision 18 Nov. 2009. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/>, Accessed 9 March 2010.

[2] Wiktionary entry for "Artifact." <http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/artifact>, Accessed 9 March 2010.

[3] Chuck Huff. Why a Sociotechnical System? http://computingcases.org/general_tools/sia/socio_tech_system.html, Accessed 9 March 2010.

[4] Nissenbaum, H. 1994. Computing and Accountability. *Commun. Acm* 37, 1 (Jan. 1994), 72-80.

[5] Som, C., Hilty, L. M. & Ruddy, T. F. (2004). The Precautionary Principle in the Information Society. *Human and Ecological Risk Assessment*, 10 (5), 787-799.

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